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Although subsidizing policies are not highly evaluated in environmental economics since 
they are contrary to “The Polluter Pays Principle” and there is a budget constraint, many 
countries have in practice introduced several subsidizing policies and some of them have 
been effective in promoting investments to a certain degree. 
This paper explores the conditions under which subsidizing policies are effective in 
diffusing new technologies using a case of a Swedish subsidizing policy, “the local 
investment program” (LIP) 1998-2002. In the LIP scheme, municipalities make an 
investment program for environmental protection in their region and subsidies are 
granted to excellent programs after screening by the Swedish government. An investment 
program in general consists of several projects by municipal authorities, municipal 
companies, private companies and so on. One of the features of the LIP is that subsidies 
are granted to each project through municipalities, so in order for private companies, 
individuals and other organization to obtain subsidies their projects have to be included 
in a program by the municipality. 
Most projects would not have been implemented without LIP subsidies, so we could 
evaluate the LIP promoted additional investments. But there were not many projects 
using new technologies although it was at first one of the purposes of the LIP. The 
reasons could be attributed to the fact that the LIP subsidies were granted through 
municipalities and to win the race for subsidies municipalities tended to avoid including 
projects with high uncertainty in their program. The competition among municipalities, 
which had been considered to promote unique programs, might prevent municipalities 
from introducing projects with new technologies in this case. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Subsidies are not highly evaluated as environmental policy instruments. They are 
contrary to the “polluter pays principle” (PPP), there is a budget constraint so it is 
impossible to continue subsidies indefinitely. Even so, however, the reality is that many 
countries have implemented some sort of subsidies as part of their environmental policy, 
and these have become especially common as means for developing and disseminating 
technologies with a low environmental load. There exist some researches to show that 
these subsidies are effective. For example, Jaffe and Stavins [1995] use data from the 
United States that provides a quantitative analysis of factors in deciding whether to use 
heat insulating technology in new housing construction. They showed that if insulation 
technology installation costs fell at the same rate that energy prices rose, the reduction in 
installation cost was three times more likely to promote adoption of the technology as the 
rise in energy prices. This indicates that lowering the installation costs of environmental 
protection technology through subsidies is more effective for dissemination of this 
technology than raising energy prices through introducing taxes1. In other words, it 
shows that under certain conditions, subsidies can function very effectively, even though 
they are contrary to the PPP and there exist financial constraints. 
In order for subsidizing policies to work effectively, two conditions are required: the 
first is appropriate assessment. Even if projects that receive grants and subsidies 
contribute to lightening the environmental load, it would not be a sufficient reason to 
deem them effective, because the project may have been implemented anyway without a 
subsidy. If such a project receives a subsidy, the subsidy will not promote additional 
investments and all that happens is that those who implement the project have their 
financial burden lightened. Therefore, the projects that the government ought to subsidize 
are the ones that would not be implemented without a subsidy, but since it is inefficient to 
subsidize projects that are not cost effective, it is desirable to focus on groups of projects 
that are “relatively” cost effective. That is to say, the criteria for judging include whether 
or not the project would occur without the subsidy, and also whether the investment is 
effective and efficient. These standards are important in terms of equity. For example, if 
energy saving projects with a very short pay-back time receive subsidies as well, then 
entities that have been taking a proactive approach to investment in energy saving 
projects have no scope for efficient investment and are not subsidized, while on the other 
hand, entities that have not been proactive or that purposely delayed their investment will 
still have some scope for efficient investment, so they receive subsidies. This is quite 
unfair. Considering these aspects, granting subsidies on the aforementioned criteria is not 
the most cost effective way to proceed. Therefore, we must be aware that it is not 
necessarily sufficient to judge subsidies as policy measures only from a viewpoint of cost 
effectiveness. 
Second, institutional conditions which promote a lot of applications of eligible 
projects are required. Even if responsible authorities can assess applications appropriately, 
it is difficult for subsidies to work well in case not many eligible projects are applied in 
practice.  
                                                 
1 However, this is the effect on the diffusion of individual factor technologies, and it does not indicate 
any incentive effect on the overall energy conservation efforts that include actions other than 
installation of technologies and equipment. 
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In this paper, I will consider the conditions in which subsidies effectively promote the 
dissemination of new technology by focusing on “the Local Investment Program” (LIP), 
a type of subsidy introduced in Sweden in the late 1990s with the objective of promoting 
investment in environmental protection through municipalities. Even from an 
international point of view, the LIP is a large-scale subsidy scheme, and is a unique 
system in that subsidies from the state for individual projects pass through the 
municipalities.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The section 2 presents an outline 
of the LIP and the section 3 surveys previous empirical studies on the LIP. After those, 
the section 4 investigates the reason why the LIP was not necessarily effective in the 
dissemination of new technology. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Outline of LIP 
 
In 1997, the Swedish government decided to introduce the LIP, a system by which the 
national government subsidizes environmental protection investment programs planned 
by municipalities. Almost all areas of environmental protection and improvement are 
eligible, and in addition to environmental protection, increasing regional employment 
was also considered an important objective. The central idea behind this was to make use 
of the accumulated knowledge and experience in each region for sustainable development, 
and was formulated in response to Agenda 21, which was adopted in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil in 1992. An important principle of Agenda 21 was to exercise decision making as 
close to the concerned parties as possible, and the LIP was positioned as a practical 
application of Agenda 21. 
The program implementation period was from 1998 to 2002. Municipalities2 that 
would seek LIP grants made investment programs, which bundled investment projects 
from companies and other entities that wished to participate in the municipalities’ 
programs. Municipalities were in principle the only entities that could serve as owners of 
these investment programs. The application form required applicants to describe in detail 
the amount of investment and subsidies required for each of the projects that comprised 
the program, the expected reduction in the environmental load, and the expected effect on 
employment. Projects that were required in direct response to regulations or laws and 
ones with an extremely short return on investment were ineligible for subsidies.  
At first, it was the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) that administered the LIP and 
screened the applications, but it was transferred to the Swedish Environmental protection 
Agency (SEPA) in 2002, which was the final year of the program. In Sweden, it is natural 
for subsidies not to be distributed directly by the national government, but instead by an 
independent administrative agency, and it was believed that the SEPA was ultimately the 
best organization to take responsibility for environmental subsidies. However, since the 
MOE distributed the LIP subsidies, they were criticized for possibly distributing them in 
ways that were advantageous to the central government, although officials in charge of 
distributing the subsidies at the MOE denied that there were any political considerations 
involved (SEPA [2005a], p. 39). Sweden has many subsidy measures aside from LIP, 
especially those directed at installing energy-related equipment. Projects receiving 
                                                 
2 In Sweden, “kommun” is the basic unit of municipalities. There are 290 municipalities now.  
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subsidies from other programs were ineligible and consideration was given to ensure that 
projects complemented one another.  
As a result of the screenings, the MOE and the SEPA decided to subsidize 211 
programs with a total of 1,814 projects, and total subsidies of 6.2 billion Swedish kronor 
(SEK), and in the end, 4.7 billion SEK were disbursed. The amount of total investment 
was 21 billion SEK, making it the largest environmental policy project ever carried out in 
Sweden up to that time (Table 1, Table 2). The reason the initial planned subsidy and 
actual amount granted differed greatly is that about 15% of projects approved for 
subsidies were never implemented. Also, if actual reduction of the environmental load 
proved to be much less than the initial estimate, the final subsidy granted was reduced. 
Table 2 shows the areas in which projects were implemented. All sorts of projects, 
including conversion from fossil fuels to renewable energy, energy saving, waste 
reduction, and protection of the natural environment were eligible for subsidies, and in 
particular, large number of projects concerned conversion to renewable energy, energy 
conservation, and reductions in CO2 emissions. During the screening, projects (programs) 
with different characteristics from several regions competed with one other; for example, 
a program for wetlands conservation and a project for building bicycle paths and other 
completely different projects were compared to one another. There was no framework for 
allocating the subsidies, so not all areas received equitable treatment. Even if a program 
was approved for a subsidy, not all of the projects gained automatic approval. Some 
projects were excluded during screening. 
The composition of project owners in the programs is shown in Table 3. In most cases, 
municipalities carried out projects themselves, but public and private companies, or in 
very few cases, individuals or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were the project 
owners. There was no particular limit on the types of projects eligible for subsidies, and 
Table 4 shows by type the number of local government bodies that received subsidies. 
According to this, Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö, which are Sweden’s three largest 
cities, accounted for ¼ of all projects, and the tendency of large cities receiving subsidy 
were observed. Since subsidies did not flow directly from the national government to the 
owners of the projects, but through investment programs created by municipalities, if a 
municipality was deficient in its ability to create or manage programs, even superior 
individual projects might not be funded because of a lack of synthesis as a program. 
Each municipality was required to submit a report on the results of each program after 
the end of its implementation period. According to these reports, Sweden as a whole 
reduced its CO2 emissions by about 545,000 tons, its SO2 emissions by 590 tons, and its 
NOX emissions by 980 tons. 
After the LIP ended, the Swedish government followed up by introducing a new 
investment subsidy program administered through municipalities, known as the KLIMP, 
the climate investment program. The basic ideas and mechanisms were similar to the LIP, 
but eligibility for grants was limited to projects that prevented climate change, and even 
more detailed reports were required upon application3. Companies also became eligible 
to apply for subsidies directly in specific cases. 
 
 
                                                 
3 According to a person in charge of the LIP at SEPA, the employment data mentioned in the reports 
in particular were considered unreliable. 
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3. Previous Studies on LIP: Evaluation in Terms of Static Efficiency and Equity 
 
With regard to emission control, a necessary condition for efficient environmental policy 
measures is equalization of the marginal costs of emission reduction among the sources. 
As for subsidies, the amount of the subsidy for each marginal benefit must be equal 
among all projects. The LIP included many types of environmental load reduction 
projects, and since one project was usually predicted to reduce several environmental 
burdens, it is difficult to handle them, but Vredin Johansson [2006] used the amount of 
the subsidies as dependent variable and the environmental load reduction effects 
(predictions) described on the application forms and the variables indicating project 
attributes as explanatory variables, and then employed regression analysis to estimate the 
variables that influenced the amount of the subsidies granted. In other words, she 
estimated “subsidy functions.” Taking reduction of CO2 emissions as an example, if we 
use the predicted CO2 reductions estimate as an explanatory variable, the estimated value 
of its coefficient shows the marginal subsidy amount, which is the marginal amount that 
the national government intends to pay for reducing CO2. After using dummy variables to 
determine whether there is a difference among the marginal subsidies for each category, 
her results showed that the amount of marginal subsidy expenditures among categories is 
not significantly different. This shows that at least subsidies were efficiently allocated4. 
As mentioned in Section 2, the projects that should receive subsidies are the investments 
that would not be conducted without a subsidy, and not the most cost-effective 
investments, so it is important to pay attention to the fact that minimizing expenses is not 
an absolute condition. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the MOE is a governmental organization and its 
direct participation in granting the subsidies of the LIP were criticized as possibly 
allowing political consideration toward the ruling party. Again, in order to test the 
existence of political considerations, Vredin Johansson [2006] extended the model 
described above, in addition to expected numerical values of the environmental 
improvements, and employment effects noted on LIP applications, included the 
percentage of representatives from the ruling Social Democratic Party (the sponsors of 
LIP) in each local government as an explanatory variable, and analyzed the influence on 
granting subsidies. The result was that the percentage of Social Democratic Party 
members in the local government had no significant effect on subsidies. However, the 
number of members of the Green Party, which is a member of the ruling coalition, had a 
significantly positive influence. 
Vredin Johansson [2006] employed data only from projects adopted by LIP, but 
Berglund and Hanberger [2003] took data from municipalities that were not adopted for 
LIP, and used a Logit model for a quantitative analysis to investigate the attributes of the 
municipalities whose applications were accepted. There was a strong, significant 
tendency for areas with large populations and programs created by municipalities with 
independent environmental offices to be adopted for LIP, but like Vredin Johansson 
                                                 
4 The marginal subsidies that Vredin Johansson [2006] estimated were lower than the standard carbon 
tax rate. Given this fact, Vredin Johansson [2006] concludes that by assuming that the carbon tax rate 
expresses the social costs of CO2 emissions, then LIP was an especially effective way of reducing 
CO2. 
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[2006], their results showed that there was no significant effect from the Social 
Democratic Party holding the majority in any local government. 
Based on the results of these quantitative analyses, allocation of the LIP subsidies was 
not particularly inefficient, while there were no systematic political considerations toward 
municipalities controlled by the ruling party, even though such considerations were not 
entirely absent. All in all, it is possible to say that projects were screened in an 
appropriate manner. 
However, the strong tendency that LIP subsidies go to cities with large populations 
may reflect the various “capabilities” of those municipalities. While selected 
municipalities had an opportunity to increase their capabilities through their experiences 
with the LIP, municipalities with relatively less capability were not granted that 
opportunity, and we cannot overlook the concerns of increasing disparities among 
municipalities. There is a possibility that these situations may discourage the areas whose 
municipalities were not selected for the LIP to deal proactively with environmental 
problems (SEPA [2005a], p. 42). 
 
 
4. Effects on Dissemination of New Technology 
 
One of the crucial things when evaluating the LIP is whether the LIP subsidies were 
granted to investment projects that would not have been implemented without them. 
Although there are no data for the LIP as a whole, according to a SEPA survey conducted 
for district heating projects subsidized by the LIP, about 80% of respondents indicated 
that without the LIP they would not have implemented their projects or implementation 
would have been delayed or the scale of the project would have become smaller. 
Moreover, since the criteria for subsidies considered projects with an excessively short 
return on investment period as ineligible (SEPA [2005b], p. 16), it is reasonable that the 
aforementioned criteria were met in other fields as well. 
The SEPA has published reports by each category on the effects of the LIP. 
According to these reports, it has been evaluated that while somewhat incremental 
technologies were introduced, few new technologies were introduced (SEPA [2004a], 
SEPA [2004c]). According to the SEPA [2005a], the central government initially 
presented installation and dissemination of new technologies as one of the important 
objectives of the LIP. In fact, “introduction of new technology” was made a condition for 
private companies that administered projects, but that requirement did not yield sufficient 
results, and most entities used incremental technology. It goes without saying that 
introduction of new technology is not easy, but a question remains on why the LIP was 
ineffective in the dissemination of new technology. If the fact that few projects 
employing new technology were implemented was true, there are three possible causes. 
 
(1) 30% limit 
The SEPA has pointed out (SEPA [2005a], pp. 45-46) that there were not many 
applications for projects using new technology and that the European Union’s “30% 
rule,” was one of the reasons. The “30% rule” is a rule that avoids distortion of the 
competition conditions within the EU by stating that subsidies to private companies may 
not exceed 30% of the total amount of investment in principle. This means that there 
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were many cases where projects were not planned from the start, because it would be 
considered difficult to cover the risk of adopting a new technology if the subsidy only 
approved up to 30% of the total investment at maximum. However, the 30% rule applied 
only in cases where the project owner was a private company, and was not applied to 
other administering authorities. As Table 2 shows, in many projects for which a 
municipality was a project owner, the subsidy rate was over 30%. Nevertheless, 
municipalities and municipal companies almost did not plan projects that employed new 
technology. Moreover, when a project owner tried to obtain the LIP subsidies in case of 
replacement of their facilities, even private companies can actually receive subsidies over 
30% as follows. Denoting the amount for an investment project that uses more 
environmentally friendly but well established technologies as CA, and the amount for a 
project that uses expensive new technologies as CB, the limit of the subsidy for selecting 
higher-priced equipment with a lower environmental load is not 30% of the difference 
(CB-CA) but 30% of the total investment amount CB.  
Considering these facts, it may be true that the 30% limit may have had disincentive 
for installing new technology, but it was not crucial and other reasons also existed. 
  
(2) Institutional Features of LIP 
In the LIP scheme, a municipality forms an investment program by putting together some 
projects planned by several project owners, municipality itself, municipal companies, 
private companies and so on. The program is then assessed by responsible authorities of 
the state and is determined whether it would be subsidized or not. Since project owners 
do not receive subsidies directly from the state, even if projects employing new 
technology were proposed by private companies, they were not adopted within the LIP 
framework unless the municipality included them in its investment program. In other 
words, the attitude of the municipality was of decisive importance. 
As mentioned above, the LIP subsidized programs that were regarded excellent, 
irrespective of field or technological level, that is, there was basically no quota for each 
category. For municipalities to receive subsidies under the LIP scheme, they must 
propose an excellent program and win subsidies in a competition with other 
municipalities. The strong emphasis on competition among municipalities was intended 
to prompt the planning and implementation of projects that were uniquely creative rather 
than homogeneous [SEPA [2005b], pp. 41-42]. In fact, in many cases, each municipality 
investigated the details of the projects other municipalities were proposing, and used 
them for reference in forming their own investment program to increase the likelihood of 
a project’s adoption. As a result, it turned out municipalities tended to prefer projects 
with less uncertainty, which used established technologies rather than projects that used 
new technologies, and the tendency was strong especially in small municipalities5. 
These factors stem from the institutional characteristics of the LIP.  
 
(3) State Attitude 
SEPA [2004a] describes the assessment phase of LIP by the responsible authorities that 
an application with a certain percentage of grant was perceived to be high the responsible 
authorities did not ask municipalities to lower the demand, but rather rejected the 
application or the measure. Municipalities looked at this process, and after that, it is 
                                                 
5 Personal communication with officials of some small cities and two big cities.  
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natural they would hesitate to include projects with new technology requiring high 
subsidy rate in their program. It may be true that the state had a tendency to reject 
projects with new technology, but the institutional feature of LIP (treating new 
technology and established one on the same ground) promoted the state to do so at the 
assessment process under the condition municipalities competed for subsidies.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The reason that the LIP did not promote the implementation of new technology, could be 
attributed to the fact that municipalities did not actively engage in employing projects 
that used new technology. The LIP subsidizes excellent programs without restrictions on 
field or technology, projects with new technology or established one, projects by private 
companies or municipalities themselves, that is, all projects were equally treated in 
principle. It means the LIP scheme made established technology and new technology 
compete on the same ground. This scheme could lead to high efficiency in the short run, 
but it would make municipalities hesitate to include projects using new technology which 
were considered to be uncertain in the investment program. A competition for subsidies 
among municipalities and the state attitude at the assessment process might accelerate 
this tendency, although the element of competition was originally emphasized for 
promoting innovative projects. If promoting new technology is priority, it is not proper to 
treat new technology and established one on the same ground and a certain “quota” for 
new technology is required. It seems this type of subsidizing policy like the LIP is 
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Subsidy Average of Sub.
1000SEK 1000SEK
1998 456 2,320,457 5,089
1999 413 1,432,779 3,469
2000 507 1,487,356 2,934
2001 315 733,038 2,327
2002 123 236,349 1,922
Total 1,814 6,209,979 3,423
Table 1 Outline of LIP
Year Number of Project
Source：Johansson[2006], Table1  
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Waste disposal 180 678,514 3,770
Construction 32 220,804 6,900
After treatment 24 397,734 16,572
Energy saving 201 561,929 2,796
Renewable energy 376 1,612,444 4,288
Multidimensinal projects 86 771,117 8,966
Industrial projects 34 46,767 1,376
Nature conservation 195 401,247 2,058
Supportive measures 257 289,661 1,127
Traffic 180 629,245 3,496
Water & Sweage system 241 594,998 2,469
Other 8 5,519 690
Total 1,814 6,209,979 2,085
Source：Johansson[2006], Table2
Table 2 LIP Subsidies by Group





Municipal authority 979 54 41.0
Municipal subsidary 319 18 25.0
Company 254 14 24.0
Association 84 5 39.0
County Council 29 2 36.0
Private individual 17 1 31.0
State 15 1 39.0
Municipal association 1 0 22.0
Other collaborative 36 2 32.0
Other 43 2 27.0
Source：SEPA[2005], Table2, Table3
Table 3 LIP Subsidies  by principal










Sparcely populated 59 3
Other large 202 11
Other small 143 8
Source：SEPA[2005], Table4
Table 4 Type of Municipalities
Type Total Share(%)
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